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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT PROPERLY FOUND INDOLENCE. 
DL WHETHER THE ACTS OF THE PARTIES CONSTITUTE 
A MUTUAL ACQUIESCENCE IN THE FENCE AS A BOUNDARY 
IS A QUESTION OF LAW. 
III. WHETHER THE ACTS OF THE PARTIES CONSTITUTE 
A MUTUAL ACQUIESCENCE IN THE FENCE AS A 
BOUNDARY IS A QUESTION OF LAW. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT PROPERLY FOUND INDOLENCE. 
Appellee attempts to show that the trial court refused to find indolence. As stated in 
Appellant's Brief, the court did use the word indolence. In fact, the court specifically 
ordered the findings of fact and conclusions of law to include a finding that the Babcock 
and their predecessor did not prevent or interrupt the usage of the property by Wilkinson. 
(September Transcript, p. 14-15). The court also made it clear that he was not finding that 
the parties entered into any type of agreement on the use of the property. (September 
Transcript p.8-9). 
It is clear from the court's bench ruling and subsequent statements that the 
court found that there was an existing fence, which is referred to by the court as a 
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containment fence and that Wilkinson used the property enclosed by that fence for raising 
of crops and the grazing of cattle. Babcock and her predecessors did not disallow or 
interrupt that use by Wilkinson. The court referred to the inaction of Babcock as indolence 
and concluded that Babcock's failure to take actions to kick the Wilkinson off of the 
disputed property constituted indolence and an acquiescence in the Wilkinson' use of the 
disputed property. 
The court concluded that when the containment fence was first put, by Babcock's 
predecessor, Williams, the true boundary line was known. The fence was placed because of 
the land topography and convenience. (Bench ruling, page 1, Appendix A; June 24, 1998 
hearing transcript, page 28, lines 15 through 22). The court found that the fence was 
originally not intended as a boundary line, but was a fence of convenience. (June 24, 1998 
hearing transcript, page 29, lines 12 through 13). Babcock, in her argument before the court 
contended that the second element of "mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary" must 
be interpreted to mean that the parties intended the fence to be a boundary as opposed to a 
fence or line evidencing the parties occupation and use of the land. (June 24, 1998 hearing 
transcript, page 13, lines 3 through 8). This definition is contrary to the law in the State of 
Utah. 
As previously discussed, this doctrine was discussed in the case of Carter v. Hanrath 
885 P.2d 801 (Utah App. 1994). Carter was then reversed on appeal by the Utah Supreme 
Court because of a lack of access to the disputed property. 925 P2d 960 (Utah 1996). 
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However, the language used by the Court of Appeals defining acquiescence is applicable. 
The Court of Appeals in Carter embellished upon and defined some of the requirements set 
forth in Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417 (Utah 1990). In discussing occupation, the court 
stated, that the land must be occupied to a visible line and normal and appropriate use made 
of the disputed parcel. In discussing the requirement of acquiescence the Court stated, 
. . . that the actual knowledge of the fence or monument 
marking the disputed boundary line is not a prerequisite in 
boundary-by-acquiescence cases. . . ." 
Id at 805. 
The Court went on to say, 
.. .'[acquiescence' is more nearly synonymous with indolence,' 
or 'consent by silence,'--or a knowledge that a fence or other 
monuments appears to be a boundary,-but that no one did 
anything about it. Lane v. Walker. 29 Utah 2d 119, 505 P.2d 
1199, 1200 (1973). This accords with the dictionary definition 
of acquiescence as [p]assive compliance or satisfaction . . . 
[conduct from which assent may be reasonably inferred. . . . 
Equivalent to assent inferred from silence with knowledge or 
from encouragement, and presupposes knowledge and assent. 
Black's Law Dictionary 24 (6th ed. 1990). 
. . .Moreover, our holding that acquiescence may be imputed 
from long-term indolence is consistent with the policy upon 
which boundary by acquiescence is based, namely 'that the 
peace and good order of society require that there be stability . 
. . in the ownership of lands. . . . [B]oundary lines which have 
been long established and accepted by those who should be 
concerned should be left undisturbed in order to leave at rest 
matters which may have resulted in controversy and litigation.' 
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Id at 806. (quoting James Backman, The Law of Practical Location of Boundaries and the 
Need for an Adverse Possession Remedy, 1986 Olsen v. Park Daughters Inv. Co., Utah 2d 
421,425,511 P.2d 145,147 (1973) B.Y.U. L. Rev. 957,965 (1986); (quoting Olsen v. Park 
Daughters Inv. Co.. Utah 2d 421, 425, 511 P.2d 145, 147 (1973)). 
Babcock contends that acquiescence in the Wilkinson's use of the property inside of 
the fence cannot constitute a boundary line by acquiescence unless the fence originally was 
intended to establish a boundary line. Clearly, that is in error. Wilkinson contends that the 
acquiescence in the use of the property enclosed by the fence line regardless of the purpose 
of the installation of the fence constitutes an acquiescence in a boundary which after a long 
period of time establishes the boundary line between the adjoining property owners. This 
is precisely the situation in the case at bar. The Babcocks have done nothing about the use 
of the property by the Wilkinsons despite knowing a different monument may be the 
boundary and without any agreement with the Wilkinson. Given these findings, the 
Appellant has met the elements of boundary by acquiescence. 
WHETHER THE ACTS OF THE PARTIES CONSTITUTE 
A MUTUAL ACQUIESCENCE IN THE FENCE AS A BOUNDARY 
IS A QUESTION OF LAW. 
Babcock next argues that the Appellant has not or cannot challenge the trial court's 
conclusion that there was no mutual acquiescence. Such an argument ignores the issues 
raised by the Appellant throughout this litigation. Appellant has consistently argued that the 
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facts in this case, as discussed above, fulfill the legal requirements for mutual acquiescence 
as defined in Carter, Olsen and Staker. 
Babcock attempts to further confuse the issue by claiming that mutual acquiescence 
is a factual, instead of a legal conclusion. This is an interesting position since Babcock's 
first issue and its level of review under his Statement of Issues, is that "establishing mutual 
acquiescence in the fence as a boundary" presents a question of law. Nevertheless, whether 
the facts and circumstances of this case amount to a mutual acquiescence, as defined by 
appropriate case law, is an application of facts to law, regardless of its categorization by the 
Appellee, and should be reviewed for correctness. The characterization by the Appellee has 
no impact on its review. As the Utah Supreme Court stated in 50 W. Broadway v. 
Redevelopment Agency. 784 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1989), 
Furthermore, we are not bound by the trial court's classification of a finding 
of fact or a conclusion of law; we will make that classification ourselves. 
Id 1171. 
Clearly, determining whether a party who condones the use of his land by another, 
for a period of twenty or more years by an adjoining landowner, amounts to mutual 
acquiescence is an ultimate question of law. Calling it a fact and asking for the clearly 
erroneous standard of review is inappropriate. 
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POINT III 
THERE IS NO CATTLE FENCE EXCEPTION TO THE 
DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE. 
Appellee also argues that the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence does not apply 
to this case because Utah law has created an exception to the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence for fences purportedly installed for cattle containment purposes. In fact, 
paragraph 7 of the Conclusions of Law drafted by the Appellee perpetuates this error in law 
by stating: "The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence or agreement does not apply in this 
action." 
However, in the most recent case involving cattle containment fences and the doctrine 
of boundary by acquiescence which was decided by the Utah Supreme Court, Jacobs v. 
Hafen, 917 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1996), the Court applied the same boundary by acquiescence 
analysis that would apply to a fence or other boundary created for any other purpose. Id. at 
1080. The court declined to find boundary by acquiescence in that case since the fence did 
not exist for the necessary twenty year period and the court refused to find an exception to 
that rule. IdLat 1081. 
Babcock cites several cases for the claim that "a fence installed to control cattle 
cannot create a boundary by acquiescence." (Brief of Appellee, p.22) (emphasis in original). 
Yet Babcock fails to cite any language stating such a rule. None of the cases cited state that 
there is an exception for a cattle containment fence. All of these cases pre-date Staker and 
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implicitly require some objective uncertainty as to the true location of the boundary. These 
cases ultimately led up to the explicit adoption of objective uncertainty as an element in the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence which has been rejected in Staker. As the Court in 
Staker found, requiring objective uncertainty confuses the doctrine of boundary by 
agreement with the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence and effectively eliminates 
boundary by acquiescence as a viable doctrine for settling property disputes in Utah. Id. at 
423. 
The most recent case cited by Appellee is Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 
467 (Utah 1989) which also pre-dates Staker. In Grayson, the Court did not rule on whether 
a fence built to control cattle could not be acquiesced in as a boundary, rather, the Court 
ruled held that there was no objective uncertainty as to the true location of the boundary and 
refused to limit the requirement of objective uncertainty from Halladav v. Cluff 685 P.2d 
500 (Utah 1984) to an "urban scenario/' Id.at 472. 
Babcock attempts to distinguish Carter v. Hanrath, 885 P.2d 801 (Utah App. 1994) 
rev'd on other grounds. 925 P.2d 960 (Utah 1996). In Carter, this Court stated that 
indolence for an extended period of time was sufficient to establish mutual acquiescence. 
The Supreme Court later reversed on the ground that the property in dispute was not 
accessible by the owners. However, in the case at bar, there was no evidence introduced that 
the property was inaccessible to the Babcocks and, as Babcock so often points out, there has 
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been at least one fence constructed on the true boundary. This demonstrate that the property 
has been and continues to be accessible to the Babcocks. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no exception to the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence for cattle fences, 
rather, the standard analysis applies. The trial court has found indolence on the part of the 
Babcocks and a lack of agreement between the parties or their predecessors regarding the 
disputed property. Indolence, together with the other facts of this case amount to mutual 
acquiescence. 
DATED this JX day of July, 1999. 
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Attorney for Appellant 
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